The Master Argument of MacIntyre\u27s \u27After Virtue\u27 by Kallenberg, Brad
University of Dayton
eCommons
Religious Studies Faculty Publications Department of Religious Studies
2011
The Master Argument of MacIntyre's 'After Virtue'
Brad Kallenberg
University of Dayton, bkallenberg1@udayton.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/rel_fac_pub
Part of the Ethics in Religion Commons, Practical Theology Commons, and the Religious
Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Religious Studies at eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Religious Studies Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of eCommons. For more information, please contact frice1@udayton.edu,
mschlangen1@udayton.edu.
eCommons Citation
Kallenberg, Brad, "The Master Argument of MacIntyre's 'After Virtue'" (2011). Religious Studies Faculty Publications. 66.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/rel_fac_pub/66
2. The Master Argument of 
Macintyre's After Virtue 
Brad J. Kallenberg 
This chapter first appeared in Nancey Murphy, Brad J. Kallenberg, and Mark 
Thiessen Nation, eds., Virtues and Practices in the Christian Tradition: 
Christian Ethics after Macintyre (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1997). 
In September of 1995 the Associated Press released a wirephoto 
showing Russian lawmakers of both genders in a punching brawl during 
a session of the Duma, Russia's lower house of parliament.' Is this 
behavior an ethnic idiosyncrasy? Do only government officials duke it 
out over matters of great importance? Or have fisticuffs suddenly 
become politically correct? No, on all counts. 
Pick a topic, any topic-abortion, euthanasia, welfare reform, mil-
itary intervention in the Balkans-and initiate discussion with a group 
of reasonable, well-educated people and observe the outcome. Chaos 
ensues. Of course the volume of the debate may vary according to how 
"close to home" the issue hits the participants. But any moral discussion, 
given a group of sufficient diversity, has the potential of escalating into 
a shouting match ... or worse. 
An even more striking feature of moral debates is their tendency 
never to reach resolution. Lines are drawn early, and participants rush 
to take sides. But in taking sides they appear to render themselves 
incapable of hearing the other. Everyone feels the heat, but no one sees 
the light. 
21 
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Many thinkers are inclined to see shrillness and interminability as 
part and parcel of the nature of moral debate. But Alasdair Macintyre 
begs to differ. In After Virtue he offers the "disquieting suggestion" that 
the tenor of modern moral debate is the direct outcome of a catastrophe 
in our past, a catastrophe so great that moral inquiry was very nearly 
obliterated from our culture and its vocabulary exorcised from our lan-
guage. What we possess today, he argues, are nothing more than frag-
ments of an older tradition. As a result, our moral discourse, which uses 
terms like good, and justice, and duty, has been robbed of the context 
that makes it intelligible. To complicate matters, although university 
courses in ethics have been around for a long time, no ethics curriculum 
predates this catastrophe. Therefore, for anyone who has taken ethics 
courses, and especially for those who have studied ethics diligently, d1e 
disarray of modern moral discourse is not only invisible, it is considered 
normal. This conclusion has been lent apparent credibility by a theory 
called emotivism. 
Emotivism, explains Macintyre, "is the doctrine that all evaluative 
judgments and more specifically aU moral judgments are nothing but 
expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling .... "2 On this 
account, the person who remarks, "Kindness is good," is not making a truth 
claim but simply expressing a positive feeling, "Hurrah for kindness!" 
Similarly, the person who exclaims, "Murder is wrong," can be understood 
to be actually saying, "I disapprove of murder," or "Murder, yuck!" 
If emotivism is a true picture of the way moral discourse works, 
then we easily see that moral disputes can never be rationally settled 
because, as the emotivist contends, all value judgments are nonrational. 
Reason can never compel a solution; we simply have to hunker down 
and decide. Moral discussion is at best rhetorical persuasion. 
There are sound reasons for questioning the emotivist picture. In 
the first place, emotivism is self-defeating insofar as it makes a truth 
claim about the non-truth-cJaim status of all purported truth claims! To 
put it differently, if all truth claims in the sphere of ethics are simply 
expressions of preference, as emotivism maintains, then the theory of 
emotivism itself lacks truth value, and thus we are not constrained to 
believe it if we prefer not to . In addition , emotivism muddies some ordi-
narily clear waters. Any proficient language speaker will attest to the 
fact that the sense of "I prefer ... " is vastly different from the sense of 
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"You ought.. .. " The distinct uses to which we put these phrases are 
enabled precisely because the sense of "You ought" cannot be reduced 
without remainder to "I prefer." 
But Macintyre is not content to offer first-order arguments against 
emotivism. Stopping there would have made his book simply another 
ethical theory-just the sort of thing that emotivism so convincingly dis-
misses. Instead, what Macintyre is up to has been called metaethics-an 
exploration into the conditions (or conditioners) of human ethical 
thought. As a buman enterprise, ethics must be shaped in the same way 
that language, culture, and history shape the rest of our thinking. By 
investigating the historical conditionedness of our moral life and dis-
comse, Macintyre undermines emotivism, making a strong case for its 
own historical conditionedness. Emotivism as a moral philosophy 
appears to explain why contemporary moral debates are iiTesolvable. 
But it cannot account for the oddity that rival positions within these 
debates all employ incommensurable concepts. Why cannot the Kantian 
argument ("The taking of human life is always and everywhere just 
plain wrong") concede even a modicum of legitimacy to the Lockean 
("Abortion is the natural right of women") if both views boil down to "I 
don't/do approve of abortion"? Nor can emotivism explain the oddity 
that interminable moral debates are conducted with the expectation that 
such debates can be resolved and, in keeping with this optimism, are 
conducted in such a way that rival positions appeal to principles pre-
sumed to be ultimate. In other words, if all value judgments are expres-
sive, how did this belief in ultimate principles arise? Macintyre suggests 
that it makes more sense to look for a source of this optimism, and its 
belief in ultimates, in a tradition that predates emotivism. 
In fact, if one looks closely at the modern moral self, it has the 
appearance of being dislocated, as if it were missing something. The 
moral self as conceived by the emotivist is "totally detached from all 
social particularity" and is, rather, "entirely set over against the social 
world" (32). This autonomous self has no given continuities, possesses 
no ultimate governing principles, and is guided by no telos. Instead it is 
aimless, having "a certain abstract and ghostly character" (33). If 
Macintyre is correct in asserting that "the emotivist self, in acquiring 
sovereignty in its own realm lost its traditional boundaries provided by 
a social identity and a view of human life as ordered to a given end," 
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then it comes as no surprise that such a self flounders helplessly and 
endlessly in a moral quagmire (34). But how did this catastrophe come 
to pass, and what exactly are the social identity and telos that were lost? 
THE FAILURE OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT PROJECT 
The catastrophe that left the modern moral world in such disarray 
was a series of failed attempts to provide rational justification of moral-
ity for a culture that had philosophy as its central social activity. This 
eighteenth-century culture was called the Enlightenment, and its mis-
guided agenda Macintyre dubs the Enlightenment Project. 
Among the first attempts to justify morality were those of Denis 
Diderot (1713-84) and David Hume (1711-76). Diderot tried to make 
human desire the criterion of an action's rightness or wrongness but 
failed to answer how a conflict of desires , and hence a conflict between 
an action's rightness and wrongness, could be resolved. Like Diderot, 
Hume conceived human passion as the stuff of morality because it is 
passion, not reason, that ultimately moves the moral agent to act. Hume 
goes further than Diderot by specifying a ruling passion (he calls it 
"sympathy"), but he can provide sufficient explanation neither for why 
this passion ought to predominate nor for why his account of the moral 
life looks suspiciously like that of the English bourgeoisie he emulated.3 
Provoked by the failures of Hume and Diderot to ground morality 
in human passion, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) strove to ground moral-
ity in reason alone. He argued that if morality was rational, its form 
would be identical for all rational beings. Therefore, the moral thing to 
do is to follow those principles that can be universalized, that is, to fol-
low those principles that one could consistently wish for everyone to fol-
low. This sounds suspicious~y like the Golden Rule. What makes it 
different, however, is Kan 's conviction that the principle of universaliz-
ability (also called the categorical imperative) gets its punch from the 
requirement that it be willed without falling into rational contradiction.'' 
Unfortunately, Kant's system has several large flaws, not the least of 
which is its ability to "justify" immoral maxims such as "Persecute all 
those who hold false religious beliefs" as well as trivial ones such as 
"Always eat mussels on Mondays in March" (46). 
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S0ren Kierkegaard (1813- 55) heartily agreed with the content of 
the morality that Kant defended (middle-class German Lutheran piety), 
but he also perceived that Kant's rational vindication of morality had 
failed as miserably as its predecessors. According to Kierkegaard, all 
persons are free to choose the plane of their existence. But this leaves 
open the problem of how to decide which plane to inhabit, since the cri-
teria for making the decision are internal to the plane under considera-
tion. Shall I inhabit the plane of the pleasure-seeking aesthete or that of 
the ethical rule-follower? To choose according to passion is to be rele-
gated to the plane of the aesthetic. To choose according to reason is to 
have already chosen the ethical plane. Hence, neither passion nor reason 
can be the criterion for maldng the choice. The choice is a criterionless 
leap. Macintyre concludes: 
Just as Hume seeks to found morality on the passions 
because his arguments have excluded the possibility of 
founding it on reason, so Kant founds it on reason because 
his arguments have excluded the possibility of founding it 
on the passions, and Kierkegaard on criterionless fundamen-
tal choice because of what he takes to be the compelling 
nature of the considerations which exclude both reason and 
the passions. (49) 
So by Hume's standards Kant is unjustified in his conclusions; 
by Kant's standards Hume is both unjustified and unintelligible. By 
Kierkegaard's, both Hume and Kant are intelligible, but neither is com-
pelling. The proof of the Enlightenment Project's failure is the stubborn 
existence of rival conceptions of moral justification. 
WHY THE ENLIGHTENMENT PROJECT HAD TO FAIL 
The important thing to realize is that the Enlightenment Project 
didn't simply happen to fail , it had to fail. What doomed the 
Enlightenment Project from its inception was its loss of the concept of 
telos. The word telos is borrowed from classical Greek and means "end" 
or "purpose." When applied to human morality the term signifies the 
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answer to the question, "What is human life for?'' In Aristotle's day 
(fourth century BC), moral reasoning was an argument consisting of 
three terms. The first term was the notion of the untutored human nature 
that so desperately needed moral guidance. The second term was human 
nature conceived in terms of having fulfilled its purpose or achieved its 
te/os . The third term, moral imperatives, was that set of instructions for 
moving from the untutored self toward the actualized telos. In this way 
moral precepts weren't snatched out of thin air but got their "punch" or 
their "oughtness" from the concrete notion of what human life was for. 5 
The wristwatch is a good example of how this works. If we ask, 
"What is the wristwatch for?" the usual answer is that watches are for 
timekeeping.6 To put it more technically, we could say that the purpose 
or telos of the watch is timekeeping. Or, to put it in still other terms, we 
can say that the watch is functionally defined as a mechanism for keep-
ing time. Knowledge of this telos enables us to render judgment against 
a grossly inaccurate watch as a "bad" watch. Furthermore, our func-
tional definition also allows us to identify the functional imperative for 
watches: "Watches ought to keep time well." 
Because the Enlightenment rejected the traditionally shared con-
cept of what human life is for and started, as it were, from scratch by 
inventing the idea of humans as "autonomous individuals," the concept 
of telos, so very central to morality, was lost. Having rejected the 
received account of telos, the only remaining option upon which moral 
principles might be grounded was the untutored human nature-the very 
thing in need of guidance and, by nature, at odds with those guiding 
principles! 
The results of the failure of the Enlightenment Project were far-
reaching. First, without the notion of telos serving as a means for moral 
triangulation, moral value judgments lost their factual character. And, of 
course, if values are "factless," then no appeal to facts can ever settle 
disagreements over values. It is in this state of affairs that emotivism, 
with its claim that moral values were nothing but matters of preference, 
flourishes as a theory. Second, impostors stepped in to fill the vacuum 
created by the absence of telos in moral reasoning. For example, utilitar-
ianism can be seen to offer a ghostly substitute when it asserts that 
morality operates according to the principle of greatest goodfor great-
est number. But this principle is vacuous because the utilitarians who 
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assert it cannot adequately define what "good" means.7 Similarly, Kant 
tried to rescue the (newly) autonomous moral agent from the loss of 
authority in his or her moral statements by attempting to provide 
"rational" justification for statements deprived of their former teleolog-
ical status. Not only did Kant fail but later analytic philosophy cannot 
advance Kantian arguments without smuggling in undefined terms such 
as rights and justice. Macintyre's point is that tradition alone provides 
the sense of terms like good and justice and telos. The presence of this 
moral vocabulary in debates today only goes to show that "modern 
moral utterance and practice can only be understood as a series of frag-
mented survivals from an older past and that the insoluble problems 
which they have generated for modern moral theories will remain insol-
uble until this is well understood" (110-11). In the absence of traditions, 
moral debate is out of joint and becomes a theater of illusions in which 
simple indignation and mere protest occupy center stage: 
But protest is now almost entirely that negative phenome-
non which characteristically occurs as a reaction to the 
alleged invasion of someone's rights in the name of some-
one else's utility. The self-assertive shrillness of protest 
arises because the facts of incommensurability ensure that 
protesters can never win an argument; the indignant self-
righteousness of protest arises because the facts of incom-
mensurability ensure equally that the protesters can never 
lose an argument either. (71; cf. 77) 
NIETZSCHE OR ARISTOTLE? 
Macintyre concludes that we are faced with a momentous choice. 
The present emotivist world cannot be sustained much longer. Nietzsche 
saw this clearly. He argued convincingly that every time a person 
made an appeal to "objectivity," it was none other than a thinly dis-
guised expression of the person 's subjective will. When we look at post-
Enlightenment ethics through Nietzsche's eyes, we can see that insofar 
as the Enlightenment Project offers putative moral principles (that is, 
ones that are devoid of the background context that gives them their 
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clout), it creates a moral vacuum that will inevitably be filled by head-
strong people asserting their individual will-to-power; and to the victor 
go the spoils. To put it differently, the emotivist world is neither stable 
nor self-sustaining. Rather, it is a battleground of competing wills await-
ing the emergence of a conqueror. Once the Aristotelian model of moral-
ity was rejected and the Enlightenment Project had failed, the danger of 
an imminent Ubermensch (who resembles Hitler more than Superman) 
must be conceded. The only stopper to this danger is the possibility of 
recognizing that the Aristotelian model ought not to have been rejected 
in the first place. We are faced, then, with a momentous choice between 
Nietzsche and Aristotle. "There is no third alternative" (118). 
IN PRAISE OF ARISTOTLE 
In order for Macintyre to make a case that the Aristotelian moral-
ity ought never to have been discarded, he must first demonstrate the 
strength of this moral tradition from its origin in Homeric literature to its 
full-blown Aristotelian Thomistic form of the late Middle Ages. 
Heroic Society 
Storytelling was the primary tool for moral education in classical 
Greece. It was for this reason that Homer's epic poems reflect the moral 
structure of their times. Not only does art reflect life, but literature in 
particular is the repository for moral stories, stories that have the pecu-
liar ability of becoming embodied in the life of the community thatcher-
ishes them. This fact, that human life has the same shape as that of a 
story, will come up again in our discussion. 
The moral structw-e of heroic society has two other outstanding 
features. First, morality has a social dimension. The social mobility that 
typifies our age was entirely absent in Homer's time. Then, one was 
born into a social structure that was fixed: "Every individual has a given 
role and status within the well-defined and highly determinate system of 
roles and statuses" (122). One's social place determined both the respon-
sibility to render certain services to others (for example, it was incum-
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bent on the head of the clan to defend and protect the clan) and the priv-
ileges one could expect from others in return. What one lacked in 
"upward mobility" was compensated by greater security. To know one's 
role and status in this small social system was to have settled forever the 
question, "Who am I?" In fact, no one ever thought of asking such exis-
tential questions in heroic society because who one was was indistin-
guishable from what one did. Within this social framework the word 
virtue (arete) describes any quality that is required for discharging one's 
role. As the tlan's warrior-defender, the head of the clan needed courage 
as well as physical strength and battle savvy. Courage is also intimately 
linked to another virtue, fidelity. Fidelity and courage become obligatory 
because the community can survive only if kinsmen can be relied upon 
to fight valiantly on each other's behalf should the need arise. 
This highlights a third feature of the moral structure of heroic soci-
eties. Since morality is bound up with the social structure of the clan, 
questions about moral value are questions of fact. Just as what qualifies 
as a "right" move in the game of chess is predetermined by the agreed-
upon object of the game, so, too, the morally acceptable "move" was 
easily identified for those who participated in the "game." However, 
there was no way for a person in heroic society to step outside the moral 
"game" to evaluate it, as is possible with chess. "All questions of choice 
arise within the framework; the framework itself therefore cannot be 
chosen" precisely because the person who does try to step outside his or 
her given social position "would be engaged in the enterprise of trying 
to make himself [or herself] disappear" (126). 
Athenian Society 
Life in Athens illustrates an important moment in the life of a moral 
tradition: growth comes through crisis. In large measure, morality was a 
subject that received a great deal of attention from the Athenians because 
of a perceived discrepancy between their moral "scriptures" (the Homeric 
literature) and life as they knew it. No Athenian could conceive of living 
like an Achilles or an Agamemnon. This does not illustrate that the heroic 
society had been rnista.ken about morality's social dimension, but rather, 
that the social structure since the days of Homer had undergone such a 
30 I Brad J. Kallenberg 
drastic change (with the emergence of the city-state, or polis) that moral-
ity had necessarily changed shape too. The changes in the social world had 
the effect of broadening the range of application of the concept of virtue. 
The term no longer denoted excellence in the performance of one's well-
defined social roles (where excellence could be understood only from 
within such a role), but rather virtues signified qualities that were applica-
ble to human life in general (or, at least, human life in Athens, which in 
their minds was human life par excellence!). While the Athenians inher-
ited the vocabulary of the virtues from heroic society, the content of these 
terms was up for grabs. 
For example, the Sophists were inclined to see virtue as the generic 
name for those qualities that ensure successful living, and what counts for 
success was relative to each different city-state. When in Sparta, do as the 
Spartans do-treasure physical prowess and war craft-but when in 
Athens do as the Athenians do and hanker after beauty and truth. In 
response to their appalJing relativism, Plato charged the Sophists with 
failing to discern the difference between mundane virtues and "true" 
virtue. Plato is willing to grant that the virtues are the means to a happy 
life, but getting clear about the nature of "true" happiness (and "true" 
virtue) requires shifting one's focus from the earthly polis to contemplate 
instead the "ideal" world. Plato was convinced that this exercise in con-
templation would show that true happiness is the satisfaction of having 
lived in accordance with one's true nature. Human nature, according to 
Plato, was composed of three parts. The highest part-that which partic-
ipates most fully in the realm of the Ideal-is the intellect and is assisted 
in its function by the virtue of wisdom. The lowest part-that which is 
shared with the beasts-is the desiring part and is to be constrained by 
the virtue of prudence. Between lay a motivational wellspring, or high-
spirited part, that is assisted by the virtue of courage. A fourth virtue, jus-
tice, refers to the state of affairs when all three are in proper order with 
respect to each other. This .set of four virtues is called cardinal (from the 
Latin cardo, whic,h means "door hinge") because they are the qualities 
upon which the truly happy life hangs.8 
It is important to remember that these two contemporaneous but 
varying conceptions of the virtues were attempts to align the concept of 
virtue with the purpose of life as understood in the newly broadened 
context-that of the polis. This broadening was the first movement 
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toward the belief in a universal order, which finds clearer expression in 
Aristotle. 
But Plato did not have the last word even in his own day. His pack-
age of virtues, together with the moral order it depicted, was all too neat. 
The tragic dramatists, such as Sophocles, explored the kinds of real con-
flicts that might arise between virtues or between goods . To put it differ-
ently, the moral order sometimes makes rival and incompatible claims 
on a person that can force him or her into a tragic situation of having to 
make a choice between two or more socially incumbent duties, each of 
which entai Is dire consequences. In grappling with this conflict, the 
Sophoclean protagonist is forced to transcend his or her society while 
remaining inescapably accountable to the higher moral order. 
Here, then, is not simply an argument over which of two lists of 
virtues is better (Achilles' courage or Oedipus's wisdom) but rather an 
argument over which narrative form (Homer's epic poetry or a 
Sophoclean tragedy) best depicts the form of human living. Macintyre 
suggests a general lesson to be learned: "to adopt a stance on the virtues 
will be to adopt a stance on the narrative character of human life" pre-
cisely because narrative and virtues are mutually supporting and "inter-
nally connected" concepts (144). 
Aristotle's Model 
To defend Aristotle as the apex of virtue theory, Macintyre must 
make a characteristically un-Aristotelian move. He must show that 
Aristotle lies along the historical trajectory that begins with Homeric lit-
erature and is, therefore, indebted to and dependent upon his predeces-
sors.9 Furthermore, Macintyre must show that Aristotle's formulation of 
moral philosophy has advanced beyond that of his predecessors while 
retaining characteristic features of the overall tradition. To do this 
Macintyre focuses on four features in Aristotle's thought. 
First, the concept of a moral order, which began to emerge in 
Plato's thinking, becomes more explicit in Aristotle. However, unlike 
Plato's conception of moral order, which ruled as it were from above, 
Aristotle sees this moral order as internal to what it means to be human. 
Humans are teleological beings, which is to say, human living aims at 
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an end, or telos. Some ends are intermediate rather than terminal. The 
ship at which shipbuilding aims may in turn be a means for the practice 
of war craft, which itself may be a means to a yet more distant end. 
Aristotle reasons that human action consists of means-end chains, which 
converge on one ultimate end called the Good. The extent to which 
humans achieve their telos is the extent to which they participate in the 
Good. In Aristotle's mind, the telos can be conceived only in terms of a 
thing's natural function. Similarly, virtues are function-specific, or more 
precisely, excellency of function.' 0 To illustrate, if the function of a horse 
is to run, then the telos of a horse is racing, and its virtue is its speed. 
Virtues, therefore, are qualities that assist achievement of the telos, and 
the telos of a thing is bound up in the nature of the thing. 
The nature of human beings, upon which the notion of the human 
telos depends, is bound up in the metaphysical structure of the soul. 
According to Aristotle, while we may share the vegetative (growth) and 
locomotive (movement) soul-stuff with the animals, humans are distin-
guished in the chain of being by their rational souls. The end of human 
life, therefore, is rationality, and the virtues are (1) virtues of character, 
which assist living according to reason, and (2) virtues of thought, which 
enable proper exercise of reason itself. 
The notion of a function-specific telos represents an advance over 
earlier formulations of the tradition by providing a clearer account of 
moral imperatives. As noted earlier in the wristwatch illustration, it is 
the concept of telos that provides human beings with moral imperatives. 
If the function of a watch is timekeeping, then it ought to keep time well. 
If the function of human beings is rationality, then humans ought to live 
in accordance with, and in right exercise of, reason. 
The second feature of Aristotle's moral philosophy is eudaimon.ia. 
A difficult word to translate-blessedness, happiness, prosperity-it 
seems to connote "the state of being well and doing well in being well, 
of man's being well-favored-himself and in relation to the divine" (148). 
Eudaimonia names that telos toward which humans move. Virtues, then, 
assist the move~ent toward eudaimonia, but eudaim.on.ia cannot be 
defined apart from these same virtues: 
But the exercise of the virtues is not in this sense a means to 
the end of the good for man. For what constitutes the good 
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for man is a complete human life lived at its best, and the 
exercise of the virtues a necessary and central part of such a 
life, not a mere preparatory exercise to secure such a life. 
We thus cannot characterize the good for man without 
already having made reference to the virtues. (149) 
The apparent circularity of the relation between telos , eudaimonia, 
and virtue is not a mark against Aristotle's system but, rather, an advance 
over Plato's . For Plato, "reality" not only denoted the world of rocks and 
doorknobs, it also included the world of intangibles such as "love" 
and "17"-things whose existence in the realm of Form is every bit 
as real as the middle-sized dry goods that clutter our sensible world. As 
Plato saw it, "true virtue" belonged to the realm of Form, and particular 
human qualities were deemed "virtuous" to the extent that they resem-
bled the "true virtue" of which they were copies. Thus, there could be no 
inherent conflict or disunity between particular virtuous qualities; any 
tragic conflict was simply a function of imperfection in copying univer-
sal virtue into particular living. In this way, morality was thought to be 
objective and moral reasoning an exercise of the intellect according to 
which the mind grasped the Form of "true virtue." Ironically, Plato's 
doctrine failed even to overcome the relativist claims of the Sophists and 
tragic dramatists of his own day. Although Macintyre does not think that 
Aristotle himself explicitly conquered the problem of what to do when 
virtues conflict, his model, which defines telos, eudaimonia, and virtue 
in terms of each other, does point the way toward conceiving moral rea-
soning as a skill rather than as an exercise of intellect (as Plato and the 
later Enlightenment thinkers imagined). Such skill could be attained and 
cultivated only from within the form of life in which these concepts were 
at home. 
The third feature of Aristotle's system is the distinction between 
theoretical reasoning and practical reasoning. Practical reasoning begins 
with a want, or goal, or desire and always terminates in action. Suppose 
you are thirsty after a long day of shopping. The major premise of your 
reasoning process is your (obvious) belief that anyone who is thirsty is 
well advised to find a drinking fountain. The minor premise of this line 
of thought is your knowledge that a drinking fountain exists in the north-
west corner of this particular department store. Your practical reasoning 
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terminates in your act of walking to the northwest corner of the store and 
quenching your thirst. 
In Aristotle's way of looking at things, moral reasoning is an 
instance of practical reasoning. It is assisted by virtues of character 
(which temper, guide, and shape initial desires) and virtues of thought 
(such as phronesis, which enables the perception of practical reasoning's 
major premises)." 
Perhaps the most important use of practical reason is its employ-
ment in the balancing of human activities. I cannot spend all my time in 
theoretical contemplation, the highest faculty of reason and thus the 
highest human good (158), because I would soon starve to death. In 
order to maximize the amount of time I can engage in contemplation, I 
must balance this activity with work, civic duty, and the like. This men-
tal balancing act is the domain of practical reason. This explanation also 
sheds light on why vittuous persons make the best civic leaders , since 
skill in practical reasoning is also what it takes to run the polis. 
The fourth feature of Aristotle's moral philosophy that Macintyre 
emphasizes is friendship. Friendship, of course, involves mutual affec-
tion, but for Aristotle, "that affection arises within a relationship defined 
in terms of common allegiance to and a common pursuit of goods" 
(156). This is to say that Aristotle's notion of friendship presupposes, 
first, the existence of the polis , which renders common good possible, 
and second , that this good itself is the heal th of the polis: "We are to 
think then of friendship as being the sharing of all in the common proj-
ect of creating and sustaining the life of the city, a sharing incorporated 
in the immediacy of an individual 's particular friendships" (156). 
The emphasis on friendship in Aristotle illustrates one aspect of 
continuity in this hi storic tradition, namely, that the moral structure is 
intimately linked with social relationships. 
OBSTACLES TO BE HURDLED 
Aristotle is definitely the hero of Macintyre's account. And at the 
time After Virtue was written (1981, revised 1984) Macintyre saw Aristotle 
as the apex of the virtue tradition.'2 However, if Macintyre is to succeed in 
rejuvenating the Aristotelian tradition, he must overcome three difficulties 
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in Aristotle's account that threaten to topple the whole project. First, 
.Aristotle's notion of telos rests on his distinctive "metaphysical biology." 
In Aristotle's view, the form guarantees that all humans share a common 
essence. The essence of humanness is rationality. Rationality is of two 
sorts, theoretical and practical. The telos of human life, then, is actualiza-
tion of both forms of reason. The goal of theoretical reason is contempla-
tion ; the goal of practical reason is life in the polis. Aristotle's problem was 
to give an account of how pursuit of these two forms of rationality could 
be reconciled. Macintyre's problem is to provide a replacement for 
Aristotle's concept of form that will enlighten us as to the telos of human 
life. Traditions provide answers to this question. Second, the vi.Jtue tradi-
tion sees morality as inextricably enmeshed in the life of the polis. What 
does this do for the applicability of the Aristotelian model today, in view of 
the extinction of the polis? Third, Aristotle retains Plato's belief in the unity 
of the virtues, which implies that every putative case of tragedy reduces to 
an instance that is "simply the resu lt of flaws of character in individuals or 
of unintelligent political arrangements" (157). As Sophocles dramatized, 
instances of tragic evil were not inconceivable. Can such real conflicts be 
interpreted as contributing to the moral life rather than confusing it? 
In addition to the three problems internal to Aristotle's account, 
Macintyre notes one problem external to it. To identify the trajectory 
from Homer to Aristotle to Aquinas to the present as a single tradition, 
something must be done to reconcile the diversity in the lists of virtues 
taken from every age. Not only have the lists changed with each succes-
sive formulation of the tradition , 13 but how virtue is defined at one point 
in history is at odds with the definition explicated in another age. 1' Thus, 
the fourth problem Macintyre must overcome is the challenge of demon-
st:rating the kind of continuity between these formulations that makes 
these disparate accounts a single, unified tradition. 
We now turn to Macintyre's own "metanarrative" to see if he is 
successful in his endeavors. 
ETHICS A LA MACINTYRE 
The disparity between virtue lists and even between the definitions 
of the term can be reconciled, says Macintyre, by bringing to light the 
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particular backdrop that each formulation presupposes. The tricky part of 
his analysis is that each of the central concepts-virtue, practice, narra-
tive , and tradition-can be defined only, finally, in terms of the other con-
cepts. This does not make the Maclntyrean version guilty of circularity. 
It simply means that getting a handle on his explanation is not like build-
·ng a house (which progresses incrementally, brick by brick) but like 
watching the sun rise-the light dawns gradually over the whole. 15 
Practices 
The cornerstone of this backdrop is the idea of practices. Macintyre 
defines a practice somewhat tortuously as 
any coherent and complex form of socially established 
cooperative human activity through which goods internal to 
that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to 
achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate 
to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the 
result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human 
conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systemati-
cally extended. (187) 
Attention to the grammar of this sentence reveals four central con-
cepts. First, practices are human activities. However, these are not activi-
ties of isolated individuals but socially established and cooperative 
activities. Such activities cannot be executed alone but require participa-
tion by like-minded others. In addition to being social, these activities are 
also complex enough to be challenging, and coherent enough to aim at 
some goal in a unified fashion. Building a house is a practice, while tak-
ing long showers is not. ] he game of tennis is a practice, but hitting a 
backhand is not. Medicine is a practice, while gargling mouthwash is not. 16 
Second, pr~ctices have goods that are internal to the activity. Some 
practices, for example, jurisprudence, have external goods- money, 
fame, power- that come as by-products of the practice. But true prac-
tices are marked by internal goods- those rewards that can be recog-
nized and appreciated only by participants. 17 For example, I can bribe 
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my son with pieces of candy to learn the game of chess. But at some 
point he may begin to enjoy the game of chess for itself. At this point he 
has become a practitioner and member of the greater community of 
chess players. He has, furthermore, become hooked on its internal 
reward-the joy of chess-something to which all players have access. 
Third, practices have standards of excellence without which inter-
nal goods cannot be fully achieved. The joy of chess is in having played 
well. And what counts for excellence has been determined by the histor-
ical community of practitioners. The practitioners have recognized that 
stalemate is not as desirable an endgame as checkmate. And to execute 
a queen-rook fork is more satisfying than simple en passant. 
Fourth, practices are systematically extended. As practitioners 
have striven for excellence day in and day out over the years, the stan-
dards of the practice, along with practitioners' abilities to achieve these 
standards, have slowly risen. Perhaps no field better illustrates this than 
medicine. Doctors were no doubt sincere when they once treated fevers 
with leeches, but contemporary physicians possess skills that far surpass 
those of their predecessors. Yet the dependence of contemporary practi-
tioners upon their predecessors is unquestionable: it is precisely because 
previous doctors strove for excellence that the specific advances in med-
icine that have been made have been made. But increase in technical 
skill does not quite capture what is meant by the notion of systematic 
extension. It also includes the way technically proficient doctors have 
come to appreciate how the health of a patient is a function of a larger 
system. Thus, the practice of medicine is slowly being extended to 
encompass care for the whole patient in all his or her psychosocial com-
plexity.'8 
Against the backdrop of practices, virtue can be defined as "an 
acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to 
enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the 
lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods" 
(191). The clan leader who practices war craft and the church father who 
practices evangelism are assisted by the qualities of courage and humility 
respectively. Against this backdrop many of the discrepancies between 
virtue lists can be reconciled as a matter of differences of practice. 
In our smorgasbord era it is tempting to think of practices as self-
contained exercises. In fact, many practices are so complex that they have 
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become an entire tradition in themselves. Medicine, science, and war craft 
all have attending epistemologies, authoritative texts, structured commu-
nities and institutions, and histories of development. Other practices are 
parts of clusters that contribute to the identity of a tradition. For example, 
the Christian tradition defines itself as a socially expanding movement 
called "the kingdom of God." At its core, therefore, Christianity seems to 
consist primarily of the practice of community formation. Subpractices 
that contribute to community formation can be categorized under the 
rubrics of witness, worship, works of mercy, discernment, and disciple-
ship. 19 Other schemes can be imagined of course, but my point is that 
Christianity cannot be explained or understood without reference to a dis-
tinctive cluster of practices. In order to participate in the tradition called 
Christianity one must necessarily participate in these practices. To put it 
another way, to participate in the community is to participate in practices 
because communal life is the point at which the practices intersect. 
Furthermore, knowing the constitutive practices of Christianity tells us a 
great deal about how Christians ought to live. If virtues are cultivated by 
striving for excellence in the practice of practices, then we are unable to 
grow in Christlikeness unless we participate in Christianity's practices. 
Narrative 
A second crucial concept that serves as a backdrop to our under-
standing of the virtues is narrative. Macintyre explains narrative this 
way. Imagine that a woman approaches you at a bus stop and says, "The 
name of the common wild duck is histrionicus histrion.icus histrion.i-
cus." Now, what would you make of this person? Truth is, you can't 
make anything of her, or of her action, without more information. Her 
act is completely unintelligible. But now suppose it becomes known that 
this woman is a libraria , and she has mistaken you for the person who 
earlier had asked for the Latin name of the common wild duck. We can 
now understand her action because it has been put into a context. The 
contexts that make sense out of human action are stories or narratives. 
To explain an action is simply to provide the story that gives the act its 
context. We can imagine any number of stories that might make sense 
out of the bus stop incident (for example, perhaps she is a Russian spy 
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whose password is the sentence in question). But we will also say that 
the explanation of her action is rendered more fully if we can tell the 
story that takes her longer- and longest-term intentions into account and 
shows how her shorter-term intentions relate to the longer-term ones. So 
we might discover that she has rushed out of the library in search of a 
particular patron because she has been put on a standard of performance 
under threat of losing her job. Her longer-term intention is to save her 
job. Her longest-term intention might be uncovered in telling the story 
of how she is the sole provider for her paraplegic son. Macintyre reasons 
that if human actions are intelligible only with respect to stories that 
contextualize intentions, then that which unifies actions into sequences 
and sequences into a continuous whole is the story of one's life. My life 
as a whole makes sense when my story is told. 
This has important consequences for the problem of Aristotle's 
"metaphysical biology." Imagine we had the opportunity to ask Aristotle, 
"How can I know that I am the same person as the me of ten years ago?" 
He would likely reply, "Though your body changes through growth and 
decay, your form, or essence, is immutable." But this answer is not likely 
to fly very far for a modern audience. In contrast, Macintyre suggests that 
narrative provides a better explanation for the unity of a human life. The 
self has continuity because it has played the single and central character in 
a particular story-the narrative of a person's life. Macintyre puts it this 
way: the unity of the self "resides in the unity of a narrative which links 
birth to life to death as a narrative beginning to middle to end" (205). 
Just as practices have a characteristically social dimension, so also 
do narratives. Humorist Garrison Keillor reminisces about the distinc-
tive characters who populated the Lake Wobegon, Minnesota, of his 
childhood. But notice how in identifying themselves as "Norwegian 
bachelor farmers" such folk have immediately linked who they are with 
others who share these ethnic, gender, and occupational features. I can-
not explain who I am without utilizing some social place markers that 
identify me with certain strata of my community. If pressed to go beyond 
this first-level answer to "Who am I?" where can one go but to say that 
I am also someone's neighbor, child, sibling, student, mate, friend, con-
stituent, or employee? In occupying these roles we simultaneously 
become subplots in the stories of others' lives just as they have become 
subplots in ours. In this way, the life stories of members of a community 
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are enmeshed and intertwined. This entanglement of our stories is the 
fabric of communal life: "For the story of my life is always embedded 
in the story of those communities from which I derive my identity" 
(221). Our stories are concretely embedded, or our stories intersect, in 
those practices in which we· are coparticipants. For example, the role of 
ethics professor Jinks the instructor with the rest of the faculty in general 
and one group of students in particular, within the wider practice of 
graduate education. 
This construction overcomes the fear that the Aristotelian account 
of the virtues cannot be sustained after the extinction of the polis. In 
Macintyre's construction, virtues are those qualities that assist one in the 
extension of his or her story, and, by extrapolation, the extension of the 
story of his or her community or communities. The question, "What 
ought I to do?" is not a question of one's political duty as it was in 
Aristotle's day, but it is a question whose answer must be preceded by 
the logically prior question: "Of which stories am I a part?" 
Although none of us will ever have the clear moral parameters that 
were to be had in the well-defined social framework of Aristotle's polis, 
the concept of narrative embedded ness still explains the presence of nat-
ural boundaries and moral momentum. In 1994 a U.S. postal worker lost 
his job and retaliated by going on a killing spree. Our responses to his 
actions were telling. People reacted by saying he "flipped out," 
"snapped," "went berserk," or "had gone insane." Our expectation is 
. that postal workers (even unemployed ones) aren't kilJers, and once a 
postal worker type, always a postal worker type.20 This illustrates our 
deeper belief that rational human behavior is action that stays within the 
boundaries of "character." To step outside these boundaries is not merely 
to act irrationally but to Jose one's sanity. This is because the narrative 
shape of human life carries with it a certain degree of moral momentum. 
For example, my wife can bank on the fact that I won't wake up tomor-
row morning and say, "T< day I think I'll become an ax murderer." There 
is a certain momentum in who I am; I will generally stay "in character." 
The transition from who I was yesterday to who I am today will be a 
smooth one, marked only by minor changes. A drastic change in charac-
ter-whether for the better or for the worse-is always taken to be the 
result of a long-term, preexistent (though perhaps not publicly visible) 
process. 
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Tradition 
The third term that forms the backdrop to all the various accounts 
of virtue is the notion of tradition. Macintyre defines tradition as "an 
historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument 
precisely in part about the goods which constitute the tradition" (222). 
This definition has three components. First, Macintyre's understanding 
of tradition is really the logical extension of his treatment of narrative. 
To be "historically extended" is to be narr-atively extended. Just as the 
self has the unity of playing a single character in a lifelong story, so too 
the community has its own continuity-despite loss and gain of mem-
bers-because the community itself is a character of sorts in a narrative 
that is longer than the span of a single human life. For example, 
Christians in the Reformed tradition feel kinship with John Calvin 
because they can tell the story (recount the history) of the Reformed 
Church from Calvin's Geneva to their present church community. 
Second, a tradition is "socially embodied" because traditions are 
lived in community. A tradition has its inception in the formation of the 
community that is defined by those who have pledged corporate alle-
giance to the tradition's authoritative voice or text.2 ' In that this prophetic 
word shapes the practices of communal life, the community is said to 
"embody" the tradition's persona in that age. For example, early Chris-
tians prayed because their scriptures exemplify, illustrate, and command 
the practice of prayer. Outsiders, who have no access to the authoritative 
text, can still read the nature of the Christian tradition off the lives and 
practices of the community's members. Should the community die off or 
disband, the tradition passes out of existence (at least until another group 
rallies in the same way around the same text). In this way the tradition 
has the quality of being "socially embodied." However, because the 
application of the authoritative text or voice is done afresh in every suc-
cessive generation, the tradition remains a live option only so long as the 
discussion about the text's relevance and meaning is sustained. Hence, 
third, traditions are necessarily long-standing arguments. But let's get 
clearer on the notion of historical extension because this will help us 
evaluate the curr-ent status of the virtue tradition. 
Just as selves and communities are characters in their respective 
stories, so too traditions are also characters in an even wider narrative. 
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When we recount Christian, Jewish, or Muslim history, we are telling 
the story of just such a character. The viability of any one tradition is not 
merely its historical survival, however, but its historical extension. 
Macintyre uses this term to describe the growth a tradition undergoes 
through t" me as it overcomes obstacles raised against it. In his sequel to 
After Virtue called Whose Justice? Which Rationality? he defines a tra-
dition as 
an argument extended through time in which certain funda-
mental agreements are defined and redefined in terms of two 
kinds of conflict: those with critics and enemies external to 
the tradition . .. and those internal, interpretive debates through 
which the meaning and rationale of the fundamental agree-
ments come to be expressed and by whose progress a tradition 
is constituted.22 
For example, early Christians faced a crisis when they tried to rec-
oncile three seemingly inconsistent beliefs: God is one, Jesus is divine, 
and Jesus is not the Father. The well-known "solution" to this quandary 
came when the Cappadocian fathers borrowed Platon ic resources to 
frame the doctrine of the Trinity. This enabled Christians to believe all 
three propositions without logical contradiction. The universal adoption 
of their formulation as orthodoxy at Constantinople (AD 381) freed the 
Christian tradition to move on to tackle the next obstacle in its pathY We 
don't know how long the trinitarian problem might have been sustai ned 
had the Cappadocian fathers not entered the debate. We do know that by 
AD 325 the stakes were very high-unacceptable proposals were deemed 
heretical, and their authors were banished from the community (or 
worse). Were it not for belief in God's sovereignty over history, it would 
be tempting to wonder how long Christianity might have lasted had not 
the trinitarian problem b~en overcome. 
If virtue theory is itself a tradition in the sense just described then 
we can see that its viability depends upon overcoming the obstacles that 
threaten the Aristotelian version. We have already seen how narrative 
overcomes the problem of Aristotle's metaphysical biology and how 
practices overcome the problem of discrepancies in the virtue lists. The 
extinction of the polis is a third crisis that must be overcome. For 
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Aristotle, the telos of life, together with the attending virtues, can be 
expressed only in terms of life in the polis. One reason the virtuous per-
son was identical to the virtuous citizen was that without the prosperity 
and leisure engendered by the shared life of the city-state, the highest 
telos (for Aristotle, metaphysical contemplation) was an impractical and 
impossible ideal. But by exercise of practical reason the polis flourished 
in such a way that contemplation could be maximized (at least by the 
elite). However, a more fundamental reason virtue was tied to the polis 
was that the Good, at which human life aims, was thought to be a cor-
porate Good that could not be possessed by isolated individuals but only 
jointly in community. The polis was the by-product of pursuing this cor-
porate Good together. To put it differently, the Good was this corporate 
life. But now the polis is no more. Therefore, in order for the virtue tra-
dition to be extended, there must be an alternative way to understand the 
social dimension of virtue. Of course, this is ground we have already 
covered. The narrative shape of human existence-that is, that human 
sociality is identical to the embeddedness of our respective narratives-
shows the way to preserve the sociality of virtue theory even in the 
absence of the polis . 
Narrative extends the Aristotelian tradition in another way as well. 
Macintyre credits the high medieval age with conceptualizing the genre 
of our narrativity to be akin to the quest for the Holy Grail: "In the high 
medieval scheme a central genre is the tale of a quest or journey. Man is 
essentially in via. The end which he seeks is something which if gained 
can redeem all that was wrong with his life up to that point" (174-75). 
Macintyre goes on to say that this move was un-Aristotelian in at least 
two ways. First, it placed the telos of life beyond life, in contrast to 
Aristotle, who imagined the telos of life to be "a certain kind of life." 
Second, it allowed for the possibility of positive evil in contrast to the 
Aristotelian scheme, which understood evil as always the privation of a 
good. These two features gave the medieval view an advantage over 
Aristotle in dealing with the problem of tragic evil. In the eyes of the 
medieval person, the achievement of the human telos counterbalanced 
all evil, even evils of the tragic sort envisioned by Sophocles. Thus, the 
fourth objection that threatened Aristotle (that is, tragic evil) has been 
overcome by the Aristotelian tradition: 
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The narrative therefore in which human life is embodied has 
a form in which the subject. . .is set a task in the completion 
of which lies their peculiar appropriation of the human good; 
the way toward which the completion of that task is barred 
by a variety of inward and outward evils. The virtues are 
those qualities which enable evils to be overcome, the task to 
be accomplished, the journey to be completed. (175) 
Macintyre concludes, therefore, that tragic choices are real but 
that the inevitability of such choice does not render morality unintelligi-
ble or criterion1ess (as the emotivist claims, thereby concluding that 
moral choices boil down to matters of preference). Rather, such choice 
plays a central role in the development of character by providing an 
occasion for moral agents to exercise and build virtue when they sustain 
the quest for good precisely at the time it is most costly to do so. If "the 
good life for man is the life spent in seeking for the good life for man, 
and the virtues necessary for the seeking are those which will enable us 
to understand what more and what else the good life for man is," then 
tragic evil is overcome because evil, even evil of the tragic sort, cannot 
diminish this kind of good (219). Instead of detracting from this kind of 
goodness, tragic evil can even be thought to contribute to the moral fiber 
of the life so lived. This solution to the problem of tragic evil employs a 
view of life that has come out of a particular historical cross-section of 
the tradition. Because the medieval period provides them with the 
resources for overcoming this obstacle, adherents to this tradition are 
warranted in retaining this feature from their corporate past. So then, not 
only are practices and narratives sources for understanding the human 
telos, but tradition itself contributes to this understanding. 
Identifying the genre of a tradition's narrative also makes sense 
out of the fractal symme.try that can be seen when we look at the way in 
which the narrative unity of (1) a life, (2) a community, and (3) a tradi-
tion are mutually nested . Individual, community, and tradition, while 
telling different parts of the master story, nevertheless share equally in 
the genre of that story. Thus, if the genre of the tradition is that of a 
quest, the genre of a human life is also that of a quest. And if human life 
is a quest, then human virtues are those qualities that assist it: 
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The virtues therefore are to be understood as those disposi-
tions which will not only sustain practices and enable us to 
achieve the goods internal to practices, but which will also 
sustain us in the relevant kind of quest for the good, by 
enabling us to overcome the harms, dangers, temptations 
and distractions which we encounter, and which will furnish 
us with increasing self-knowledge and increasing knowl-
edge of the good. (219) 
RETROSPECT 
Looking back, we can see not only that the virtue tradition that 
Macintyre has recounted fits his definition of tradition but that it is one 
in which he represents the most recent advance! He has succeeded in 
overcoming four important obstacles to the Aristotelian model by eluci-
dating the story about stories, or what has been called the metanarrative 
about the narrative quality of human life. In so doing he has clarified 
how the notions of telos, virtue, practice, narrative, and tradition form 
a mutually supporting and interlocking web of concepts. 
Let us recall now the master argument of After Virtue . Macintyre 
challenged us to reconsider the emotivist conclusion (namely, that 
morality is by nature nothing more than matters of preference) by argu-
ing that the Enlightenment Project's move to repudiate all things social 
(that is, virtues and practices) and all things historical (that is, narrative 
and tradition) was a major misstep. He argued further that moral imper-
atives can be derived from an answer to the question , "What is human 
life for?" In the same way the functional definition of a watch ("A watch 
is for timekeeping") entails its virtue (accuracy), its functional impera-
tive ("A watch ought to keep time well"), and its ground for being eval-
uated ("This grossly inaccurate watch is a bad watch"). To have a grasp 
on the human telos affords us with moral virtues, moral imperatives, and 
sufficient grounds for moral judgment. Furthermore, because narratives 
intersect at social practices, and practices constitute traditions, and tra-
ditions are historically (that is, narratively) extended, to understand 
virtue adequately as those qualities that assist pursuit of telos at all three 
levels, virtue itself must be given a threefold definition: 
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The virtues find their point and purpose not only in sustain-
ing those relationships necessary if the variety of goods 
internal to practices are to be achieved and not only in sus-
taining the form of an individual life in which that individ-
ual may seek out his or her good as the good of his or her 
whole life, but also in sustaining those traditions which pro-
vide the practices and individual lives with their necessary 
historical context. (223) 
Aristotle's notion of virtue as "excellency of function" has thus 
been expanded. Human virtues are learned qualities that assist us in 
achieving the human telos, which can be understood by considering (1) 
the functional definition of the human person, which is provided by the 
master story of the tradition, (2) the internal goods of those practices that 
constitute the tradition, and (3) those roles that arise at the intersection 
of our life stories. To put it differently, moral imperatives arise from that 
understanding of the human telos that arises within the context of those 
practices, narratives, and tradition in which we locate ourselves. 
CONCLUSION 
In the end there is much unfinished business. Macintyre himself 
bemoans the marked absence of moral communities in the modern world. 
But this is not the only problem that must be addressed in the wake of 
After Virtue . For example, if the answer to "What is human life for?" is 
supplied to each of us by our respective practices, narratives, and tradi-
tions, doesn't this still leave us with an incmable problem of moral plu-
ralism if not one of downright relativism? Are there some criteria for 
adjudicating multiple traditions? Further, if Macintyre's project succeeds, 
are we in the Western worl-d not faced with the dilemma of being inheri-
tors of at least two conflicting traditions (namely, Aristotelianism and 
political liberalism)? Or can Macintyre 's thesis possibly succeed if, in 
fact, the Aristotelian tradition died with the Enlightenment? With what 
resources can it be exhumed and resuscitated? 
Macintyre is not unaware of these perplexities. Some of the objec-
tions earned responses in the second edition of After Virtue while others 
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he has made the central concern of later books. But the mere presence of 
these objections does not count against his system because they become 
the fodder for enlivening the debate by which the tradition is extended. 
The question, "Is Macintyre's moral philosophy the fina l word?" is 
wrongheaded. The better question is, "Is it the best one so far?" 
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4. This can be understood by means of the following illustration. 
Consider first the case where lying is simply speaking the opposite of the truth, 
A person faced with the question of whether to lie on a given occasion should 
easily realize that lying cannot be universalized without rational contradiction. 
For if everyone lied, then lying would become the normal mode of communica-
tion. If everyone always lied, we would simply adjust our expectations and 
hence could navigate just fine. For example, one day my eight-year-old son 
declined my offer of a peanut butter sandwich but then reminded me with a grin 
that Tuesday was "opposite day." Once I knew the plan, we had no trouble com-
municating because I could bank on the opposite of what he said. ("Do you li ke 
it?" "No, it's awful. I hate it!") Similarly, in a world where lying was the uni ver-
sal practice, deception could not exist because lying, in effect, would have 
become the means of truth telling. Of course, this would fl y in the face of what 
we understand by the term Lying. So we run headlong into a rational contradic-
tion: Lying cannot be universalized because when universalized, lying ceases to 
be lying. Therefore, the opposite of lying must be universalizable; or to put it 
differently, truth telling is the categorical imperative. 
Now imagine the case that lying is not simple opposite-saying but dis-
tortion of truth-a mixture of truth and error. It should be clear that the sort of 
confusion that would be produced by universalizing this brand of lying would be 
on the scale that disables all commun ication-including deception. In such a 
world "intent to deceive" has no meaning. So, once again, we run up against a 
rational contradiction: universalization of lying leads to the state of affa irs in 
which what is universalized, that is, lying, is logically impossible. 
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5. Adm itted ly, the Aristotelian model of morality makes moral impera-
tives appear hypothetical-as means to socially conceded ends-but theistic 
morality has the same basic shape. The primary difference is that the theistic ver-
sion contends that the human telos is divinely determined, a determination that 
has the effect of bestowing a categorical status on moral imperatives . 
6. Of course, it could also be argued that watches make fashion state-
ments, have sentimental value, and so forth . But for sake of the illustration, let 
us imagine that watches are usefu l only for timekeeping. 
7. Please note, however, that the situation in the wake of the 
En lightenment Project's failure is far worse than merely a state of being unable 
to settle disagreements. Macintyre argues that the disagreements themselves are 
wrongheaded in the first place. Seventeenth-century empiricists thought them-
selves adequate to the task of dealing with brute fac ts, when the truth of the mat-
ter is that facts cannot be perceived apart from a conceptual framework that 
recognizes, sorts, prioritizes, and evaluates the facts. Value-laden theory is 
required to support observati on as much as vice versa. This insight was over-
looked when, in d1e transition to the world of "modern" science, the medieval 
notion offinal cause (that is, causes that proceed according to teloi) was rejected 
in favor of making efficient causes the whole ball of wax. When this scientistic 
view becomes adopted by eiliicists, what emerges is a mechanistic account of 
human action framed in terms of " laws of human behavior" with all reference to 
intentions, purposes, and reasons for action omitted. The "facts" of human 
behavior are thus construed free from value concepts (such as "good"), and 
human action is thereafter presumed to be predictab le and manipu lable like all 
other physical bodies. This presumption is embodied in the central character of 
the emotivist era: ilie bureaucratic manager. Unfortunately for the manager we 
do not possess lawuke generalizations for human behavior. In fact, human 
behav ior is systematically unpredictable for a number of reasons. Both the 
expert manager and the attending virtue of "effectiveness" are fictions that 
expose the poverty of the Enlightenment Project (cf. After Virtue , 93-99). 
8. Plato goes on to argue that society is, or ought to be, arranged along the 
same unes. The bronze class of society are those working fo lk whose citi zenship is 
assisted by the virtue of prudence. The silver class comprises d1e warriors in whom 
the high-spirited part of me soul dominates. The quality they need above all is 
courage. The gold class, of course, is made up of the philosopher-kings, whose role 
in society is not merely to rule but to contemplate truili with the aid of the virtue of 
wisdom. Social justice, in Plato's view, signified keeping d1e classes in the proper 
order, which amounted to maintaining the status quo. In this way Plato's system is 
by nature conservati ve: change (including progress) was bad; stability was good. 
9. Frederick Copleston notes that Aristotle, like Hegel, saw himself to 
be systematizing and improving upon previous ph ilosophy. See A History of 
The Master Argument of Macintyre :S After Virtue I 49 
Philosophy, 9 vols. (New York: Doubleday, 1985), 1:37 1-78. Yet while Aristotle 
appreciated hi s Platonic heritage, he conceived his own work in terms of "get-
ting it right" in those places Plato "got it wrong." What is un-Aristotelian, there-
fore, is Macintyre's historicist claim that Aristotle's work lies along a trajectory 
that stretches from Plato to the Middle Ages and beyond, a claim that necessar-
ily relativizes Aristotle's contribution to the conceptual framework he shared 
with his predecessors. Thus the "new ground" Aristotle broke must be seen as 
nothing more than intrasystematic improvements. 
10. In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle writes, "[E]very virtue causes its 
possessors to be in a good state and to perform their functions well." 
Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 
1985), 11 06a. 
J 1. Since right action follows in straightforward fashion from the initial 
desire and major premise, and since differences in initial desires as well as di f-
ferences in major premises boil down to variations in the exercise of the respec-
tive virtues, moral quandaries are nonexistent for Aristotle. When in a bind, he 
can always defer to the maxim, "The morally right action is that taken by the vir-
tuous person." 
12. In later works, Macintyre becomes convinced that Aquinas had suc-
ceeded in surpassing Aristotle on several points. See Alasdair Macintyre, Whose 
Justice? Which Rationality? and Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: 
Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1990). 
13. For example, the early church fathers champion humility as a vi1tue, 
while Aristotle repudiates it as a vice (182) ! 
14. For example, Aristotle sees virtues as the means to internal ends, while 
Benjamin Franklin sees virtues as means to external , even uti litarian, ends (1 84). 
15. This illustration comes from Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, eel. 
G. E . M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, trans. Denis Paul and G. E. M. 
Anscombe (New York: HarperTorchbooks, 1969, 1972), §14 1. 
16. For an extended discussion of practices see chapter 7 of After Virtue. 
17 . It is often, but not always, the case that internal rewards are shared 
among all practitioners without diminution. 
18. The changing mode of the physici an-patient relationships is detailed 
by William F. May in The Physician's Covenant (Philadelphia: Westminster, 
1983). 
19. For an alternate list of constitutive Christian practices see Craig R. 
Dykstra, "No Longer Strangers: The Church and Its Educational Ministry," 
Princeton Seminary Bulletin 6, no. 3 (1985): 188-200. 
20. We would even say that someone who sincere ly harbors paranoia 
that the mail carrier is a killer is mentally maladjusted. 
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21. For an extended account of how traditi ons are born and develop see 
chapter 18 of Macintyre's Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 
22. Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 12. 
23. The next major debate was the doctrine of Christ: if Christ was God 
the Son, how are we to understand the relation of his divine and human natures 
while preserving the unity of hi s person? 
